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Abstract
A ‘pragmatic’ alternative to undetachable signatures is proposed. Undetachable signatures were
introduced by Sander and Tschudin, [4], as a means of giving a mobile agent the means to sign a
message on behalf of a user, without endangering the user’s private key. The alternative discussed
in this paper involves the use of conventional signatures and public key certificates.
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1 Introduction
Much research in recent years has been devoted to the problem of providing security for mobile
agents. The problem is usually divided into two parts:
• protecting the platform on which agents run against malicious and/or unauthorised agents,
• protecting the agents against malicious platforms.
The focus of this note is the second problem, which is usually regarded as the most difficult one to
solve.
Of course, there are limits to the protection that can be offered to an agent. An agent platform can
potentially modify the agent code, and/or interfere with the data stored by an agent. Hence efforts
to protect agents reduce to either finding ways to enhance the level of trust that can be placed in
results produced by an agent, or limiting the powers given to an agent. This paper focuses on the
latter approach — in particular it considers the issue of giving an agent the power to sign on a
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user’s behalf, without running the risk of exposing the user’s private signature key to the platform
on which the agent is executed.
The notion of an undetachable signature was introduced by Sander and Tschudin in [4]. This
provides a means of providing an agent with a signature key ‘derived from’ the user’s own signature
key. Signatures produced using the derived key can be verified by anyone with access to a reliable
copy of the user’s public verification key (e.g. as obtained from a public key certificate for the user’s
key). Moreover, the user can embed within the derived key a statement as to the circumstances in
which the derived key may be used, e.g. to state what types of goods might be purchased and/or
to state a price limit.
Whilst the scheme proposed in [4] has proven insecure, an alternative RSA-based scheme proposed
by Kotzanikolaou, Burmester and Chrissikopoulos, [3], appears to be sound. However, it is a new
scheme, and should perhaps be used with care. In the remainder of this paper we describe an
alternative approach which uses only well-established cryptographic techniques.
2 Solving the problem the conventional way
We now consider an alternative solution to the problem which undetachable signatures have been
introduced to solve. This solution is wholly based on conventional cryptographic primitives, and
hence may be more likely to succeed in practice. It is also quite general in its specification, allowing
the use of any digital signature scheme.
2.1 Preliminaries
Suppose user U wishes to create a mobile agent A that may run on one or more agent platforms not
completely trusted by U . Suppose also that user U wishes to give A the power to sign statements
on behalf of U , as long as the statement conforms to rules specified in a string R (where R is in
a form agreed by all parties to the transaction). It is possible that R may be completely explicit
about the rules governing the signing process by the agent, or R may simply contain one or more
pointers to generally agreed policy statements, perhaps with additional parameters.
Note that it is implicit to the solution described immediately below, and also to the solutions using
undetachable signatures, that the agent is transferred by U to the platform on which it is to execute
by some secure means. This secure transfer should enable the receiving agent platform to check
its integrity and origin, and also should protect the confidentiality of all the sensitive parts of the
agent (most crucially including any embedded secret or private keys).
2.2 Preparing the agent
Before sending the agent A, user U performs the following steps. Note that we assume that U has
a signature key pair of its own, (SU , PU ) say, and a certificate CertU for its own public key, PU ,
signed by a Certification Authority (CA).
1. U generates a signature key pair (SA, PA) specifically for use by the agent.
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2. U creates a public key certificate CertA for the agent’s public key (PA), signed using U ’s own
signature key (SU ). This certificate also contains a copy of the string R, which states in what
circumstances A’s key may be used, and which makes it clear that PA is an agent key. It
is also expected that this certificate would have a very short lifetime, i.e. it would have an
expiry date very close to the time of issue.
3. U now equips the agent A with the private signature key SA, and copies of the two certificates
CertA and CertU .
4. A is now securely transferred to one or more agent platforms.
2.3 Executing the agent
When A executes, it may be necessary for A to sign a message of some kind (e.g. a commitment to
a transaction) on behalf of user U . Such a transaction should be signed using the agent’s private
key SA, and the signature should then be transferred with the two certificates CertA and CertU to
the entity requiring the commitment, e.g. a merchant. The recipient of the commitment, M say,
then performs the following steps.
1. The user’s certificate CertU is verified by M using a trusted copy of the CA’s public key.
Note that if M does not have this CA’s public key, then it will need to be derived by some
means, e.g. using a certificate chain.
2. The agent checks that it is prepared to accept a commitment from U , and also checks that
the name in the certificate is consistent with the user name received from the agent.
3. The agent’s certificate CertA is verified by M using the copy of U ’s public key obtained in
the first step.
4. The agent checks that the string R contained in CertA is consistent with the transaction that
is taking place.
5. The agent finally checks the agent’s signature using the copy of A’s public key obtained from
CertA.
It should be clear that, by the simple step of including R in the certificate for A’s key pair, the
power given to A by U can be limited to that specified by U . This has been achieved without any
need for a new cryptosystem.
2.4 Remarks on implementation
Before attempting to compare this new scheme with the use of undetachable signatures we make
some remarks about the implementation of the scheme.
• Given that the agent key pair has only a short lifetime, it may be possible to use a relatively
short key. That is, if the signature scheme is RSA based, a short modulus could be used, say
of 512 bits, in the knowledge that factoring the modulus and hence breaking the key would
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be infeasible during the key’s lifetime. This would make key generation faster and would
reduce the amount of key information to be transferred. It would also mean that creating
and verifying agent signatures could be made significantly more efficient.
• If a ‘weak’ key pair was used for the agent key, or, more generally, if the certificate for
the agent key pair has a very short period of validity, problems might arise if the agent’s
signature is required to have long term validity, e.g. to provide a non-repudiation service in
the event of a dispute. The ‘standard’ way of resolving this problem is to use a timestamping
service to sign a concatenation of the signature and a timestamp, providing evidence that the
signature was generated during the key’s period of validity. An alternative to using a trusted
timestamping service would be to simply require the agent platform to add a timestamp and
its signature to any signed commitments output by the agent. Not only would this provide
evidence about when the agent signed the message, but it would also enable the recipient of
the signed message to verify on which platform the agent was running. This would appear
to be a valuable service in its own right, which would apply equally to the case where an
undetachable signature scheme is employed.
2.5 A brief comparison
We now attempt to briefly compare the efficiency of the above scheme with the efficiency achievable
using an undetachable signature scheme. For the purposes of the comparison we suppose that
signatures for the scheme in this paper are computed using RSA and a hash-function, and we
compare this with the RSA-based undetachable signature scheme of Kotzanikolaou et al., [3]. To
compare the efficiencies of the two schemes we compare separately the work to be performed by
the user U , the agent A, and the recipient of the commitment, M .
• User U . For the scheme above, the user will be required to generate a key pair and certify
the public key, i.e. compute one signature and generate one key pair. For the undetachable
signature scheme of [3], the user is required to perform two exponentiations, equivalent in
complexity to performing two signatures. Note that, whilst key generation will typically take
much longer than computing a signature, key pairs could not only be made quite small (as
discussed above), but could be generated in advance. Hence, the new scheme, whilst requiring
more computation overall, actually requires less computation at the time of agent creation.
• Agent A. For the new scheme, the agent is required to compute one signature. For the unde-
tachable signature scheme, the agent is required to perform two exponentiations, equivalent
to two signatures. Moreover, for the undetachable signature scheme these will be ‘full size’
signatures, whereas for the new scheme the key lengths may be reduced (as above).
• Recipient of commitment M . For the new scheme the recipient of the signed message will be
required to verify two certificates and a signature, i.e. a total of three signature verifications.
For the undetachable signatures scheme it is also necessary to verify the user’s certificate,
as well as performing two exponentiations. Hence the two schemes have roughly comparable
efficiencies.
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It would appear that the scheme of this paper has potential efficiency advantages over the undetach-
able signature scheme, quite apart from the advantages inherent in using established cryptographic
primitives.
2.6 Relationship to secure delegation schemes
Note that the problem which the proposed solution is designed to address appears to be closely
related to the problem of secure delegation in distributed systems. Delegation refers to the situation
where one entity wishes a separate entity to perform a task on its behalf. Security problems arise
when the delegated entity does not have the access rights to perform the task, and hence must be
temporarily given these rights in order to perform the requested actions. The issue then becomes
one of giving these rights in such a way that they cannot be abused. See, for example, [1] for a
general introduction to delegation issues.
An analogous approach to the one described here has been proposed by several authors as a solution
to secure delegation — see, for example, [5]. However, instead of the use of a public key certificate,
special ‘delegation tokens’ have been proposed. Note also that, as described in [2], issues can arise
with any such solution since the originating user will have a copy of the private key generated for
agent use. The user may use this key to masquerade as the agent, and then deny the transaction,
blaming the platform on which the agent has run. The proposed use of countersignatures by the
agent platform, as described in Section 2.4 above, significantly reduces the seriousness of this threat.
3 Concluding remarks
A pragmatic solution to a mobile agent security problem has been proposed. This solution has
potential practical advantages by comparison with the use of undetachable signatures, and appears
to offer a very similar set of security guarantees. When combined with the use of signatures by
the agent platform, this solution has the potential to solve certain problems relating to transaction
repudiation.
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